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Incoded Counter-Conduct: What the Incarcerated Can Teach Us About
Resisting Mass Surveillance
Abstract
This paper reviews penal history in order to consider forms of resistance to mass surveillance. Because
experiences of surveillance are endemic to incarcerated life, identifying tactics of protest among these
populations provides valuable insights for potential forms of counter-conduct in other circumstances of
ubiquitous monitoring. We introduce the term incodification as a means of describing conditions of
continuous surveillance ingrained into infrastructures of everyday life, even as these conditions give rise to
tactics of resistance. We focus on three forms of protest: hunger strikes, alternate communication networks
and viral dance videos, drawing on Foucault’s theory of askesis in order to develop our understanding of
incodification. Our objective in introducing this term, and with our analysis as a whole, is to provoke and
promote theoretical and activist projects that both address and subvert infrastructures of incodification.
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This paper reviews penal history in order to consider forms of resistance to mass surveillance. Because experiences of
surveillance are endemic to incarcerated life, identifying tactics of protest among these populations provides valuable
insights for potential forms of counter-conduct in other circumstances of ubiquitous monitoring. We introduce the term
incodification as a means of describing conditions of continuous surveillance ingrained into infrastructures of everyday life,
even as these conditions give rise to tactics of resistance. We focus on three forms of protest: hunger strikes, alternate
communication networks and viral dance videos, drawing on Foucault’s theory of askesis in order to develop our
understanding of incodification. Our objective in introducing this term, and with our analysis as a whole, is to provoke and
promote theoretical and activist projects that both address and subvert infrastructures of incodification.
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Introduction
Mass surveillance has now become such a ubiquitous dimension of our social ecology that we can understand it as a
requisite, and minimally negotiable, aspect of daily life in post-industrial society. This surveillance spans, and in many way
blurs, the lines between public and private, as well as physical and virtual. Streets, schools and places of business are
increasingly monitored by both commercial and governmental audiovisual devices (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011; Taylor, 2010),
epitomized by London’s “ring of steel” (a nickname for the city’s pervasive closed circuit television monitoring system, see
Coaffee, 2004) and emulated in cities throughout the world (Fussey and Coaffee, 2012). Private homes are rapidly filling
with networked listening, watching and data collection devices, from general purpose mobile phones and tablets to
specialized surveillance appliances like XBOX Kinect and Amazon Echo to “smart home” devices and “internet-of-things”
sensors like Google’s Nest thermostat (Goodman, 2014). And even ostensibly private, interpersonal communications like e-
mail messages, texts and phone conversations are collected, logged and analyzed by an array of interests, from direct
marketers to counterterrorism agencies (Kadidal, 2014; Stinneford, 2014). The data we “leak” via this fragmented web of
devices, sensors, bots and dragnets are often reassembled by third-party databases without our knowledge or explicit
consent, and subject to further abuse by malicious actors (Cobb and Lee, 2014).
While surveillance of some kind has always been a dimension of social life in complex society, from whispering neighbors
(Locke, 2010) to secret police (Koehler, 1999), the massive growth in data collection, ballooning power and sophistication of
data analysis, and increasingly authoritarian deployment of data in our physical and mediated environments has contributed
to a new set of social parameters that differs qualitatively from earlier eras. In its totalizing power, its integration into socio-
technical infrastructures and its resulting inescapability, we see this new surveillance infrastructure as metaphorically akin to
institutionalized incarceration.
The term “incarceration” effectively describes not only the direct physical experience of imprisonment but also the array of
social conditions that derive from this experience; scholars like Brown (2009) and Goffman (2014) have published
compelling accounts of these conditions, requiring us to understand incarceration as more than just the relationship between
a body and a building, but rather between a body politic and the institutions that govern it. In other words, for groups of
people who are continually held in suspicion by the police, such as young men of color, incarceration encompasses not only
jail time and prison sentences, but an entire set of relationships between oppressed people and the legal system that extends
far beyond prison walls. We aim to make an analogous argument for mass surveillance by introducing the term
“incodification.”
To be incoded is to live within a constellation of social and technological constraints that makes participation via digital
networks the sine qua non of both civic and intimate relations, yet hobbles those networks with an architecture that permits,
and even presumes, ubiquitous surveillance [1] on behalf of unaccountable third parties. We choose the term incodification
as a means of consciously evoking the literal and figurative coding of power into architectures of communication; if
imprisoning the body within a closed space (carcer in Latin) is the etymological and institutional root of incarceration, then
confining the subject within a web of legal, bureaucratic and digital codes serves the same function in incodification.
Although the term refers to a disquieting set of circumstances, we use it in hopes that naming these conditions will serve as a
first step toward countering them, by developing a language of dissent and protocols of resistance.
It is important to state at the outset that there is a real risk of conflation (and moreover, of blithe indifference) in drawing a
comparison between people who are incarcerated and people whose information and communication technologies (ICTs)
are being monitored. We recognize that the scope of control is very different when monitoring refers not only to
communications but also to food, sleep and physical proximity to others. Rather than trying to draw a direct comparison
between incodification and incarceration, we intend our analysis as a strategic articulation of how modes of counter-conduct
that emerge within prisons can point towards tools of dissent in the context of technological surveillance. Following Murphy
(2012), we use the term counter-conduct to refer to practices of protest: “resistance has acquired a romantic moral valence in
Left academic work as a self-evidently desirable set of actions antagonistic to hegemony. Counter-conduct, in contrast,
invites a historicization that highlights modes of undoing, remaking and antagonism that are immanent with and animated by
hegemonic formations” [2]. In seeking instruction from instances of prison protest, we do not claim equivalence between
incodification and incarceration, but we do see possibilities for linking counter-conduct in one set of surveilled and
controlled conditions to counter-conduct in another. Moreover, the forms of counter-conduct that we identify from penal
history may or may not be understood as explicit responses to surveillance; we are interested in practices that emerge under
conditions of surveillance, born of the need to preserve dignity, privacy, community and agency.
Our approach is to provide some examples from penal history, making connections to critical theory in the context of power,
communication and subjectivity. Echoing Appadurai’s (2001) work on infrastructure of sewage as a point of intervention for
class politics, we conceptualize the socio-technical practices of surveilled prisoners as a “node at which concerns of the
human body, dignity and technology meet” [3]. In this article, we identify three such nodes, drawn from the praxis of
incarcerated communities: hunger strikes, alternative communication networks and choreographed performances of
absurdity. We divide analysis of each technology into three parts: a brief introduction to its penal history, a rearticulation in
terms of critical theory (particularly, although not exclusively, Foucault’s (1985; Bernauer and Rasmussen, 1988) construct
of askesis), and suggestions for how these forms of counter-conduct can be deployed in online activism. Across these cases,
we seek to identify acts of resistance among surveilled and dispossessed groups, and to offer potential modes of counter-
conduct for coalitional resistance to incodification.
Key terms and concepts
In considering a critical framing for incodified counter-conduct, perhaps the most immediate association is to Foucault’s
(1977) work on the panopticon. Yet as other theorists have recently noted, these models of surveillance and power may not
be the most useful for thinking through modes of resistance, especially in contemporary networked society (Bossewitch and
Sinnreich, 2013; Lovink, 2013; Lyon, 2006). Instead, we turn to Foucault’s work on askesis as a model for conceptualizing
resistance in terms of collective action and political dialogue. Foucault (1985) described askesis as a form of “training” [4],
“an exercise of self upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform one’s self and to attain a certain mode of being”
[5]. Askesis draws together the physical and the ethical, requiring acts of intentionality that “attend effectively to the self,
and to exercise and transform oneself” [6]. Highly relevant to our analysis is the conceptualization of askesis as “political
technologies of individuals” that can operationalize a set of political objectives [7]. A pivotal component of askesis is that it
operates on levels of both an individual and her surrounding community: an individual’s practices come to shape the
behaviors of people around her, becoming emblematic of her community’s ethics. Foucault was ultimately interested in
askesis as a way of theorizing how best to live, and how practices of self-maintenance act as a kind of positive
communication-cum-contagion within a community. The political potential of askesis has been assessed as a framework for
promoting sustainable consumption practices (Doran, 2011) as well as problematizing governmentality vis-à-vis conspiracy
panics (Bratich, 2003). Our analysis frames incarcerated counter-conduct as asketic tactics that have the potential to contest
mass surveillance. If incodification describes a set of conditions in which subjectivity is controlled via surveillance and
monitoring, askesis refers to a set of coordinated, responsive tactics [8] of asserting agency.
Our objective in this paper is to identify resistant tactics, drawn from the praxis of incarcerated communities, and then
reframe them to consider their efficacy under conditions of mass surveillance beyond prison walls. We begin with a
discussion of hunger strikes, as a demand for dialogue that leverages the collective display of refusal. The second tactic in
our analysis relates to alternative communication networks, exemplified by four methods of covert information transmission.
Finally, we consider the phenomenon of viral dance videos choreographed in prison, framed both through a discussion of
askesis and Rancière’s (2013) work on aesthetic politics. We do not aim to identify a comprehensive taxonomy of resistance
to incarceration and incodification, nor are we arguing that every form of resistance among the incarcerated must have its
analog among the incodified. We selected these specific tactics because they reflect a range of embodied, mediated and
ritualized responses to infrastructural control, allowing for an exploratory survey of incarceration, incodification and
counter-conduct.
Hunger strikes: The radicalized body as a tool of dialogue
Under circumstances of constant surveillance and highly structured routine, hunger strikes offer a deeply disruptive form of
protest. Publicized acts of self-deprivation have a rich and diverse history, ranging from acts of religious devotion
(MacKendrick, 1999) to performances of carnivalesque entertainment (Blyn, 2013). Among these variant forms of denying
oneself food, staging protest through a public refusal of nourishment can be traced back at least to seventeenth century
Ireland, where an aggrieved person would station himself immediately outside a neighbor’s house and refuse to move or eat
until adequately recompensed [9]. As an overtly political (and, crucially, collective) act, Ziarek (2008) argued that British
suffragettes were the first to link the practice to an abstract discourse of human rights [10], in agreement with Passmore’s
(2009) claim that hunger strikes took on a particular political valence in the twentieth century, especially among prisoners.
As a whole, hunger strikes can be defined as “a means of conducting political protest and communicating distress” [11],
through the self-deprivation of food, with two further dimensions: collectivity and catalyzing dialogue.
Contemporary examples of prison hunger strikes include members of the Russian feminist punk band Pussy Riot (Loiko,
2013); years-long protests among Guantanamo inmates (Harris, et al., 2013; Wallace-Wells, 2014); and a massive hunger
strike in California’s prison system in the summer of 2013 (St. John, 2013), which at its peak involved approximately two
thirds of California’s prison population. Hunger strikes also have a rich history outside prison walls, from Evo Morales, the
president of Bolivia, going on hunger strike against his own congress and sustaining himself on coca leaves (Garcia, 2009)
to the pacifist resistance tactics of Mahatma Gandhi (Ziarek, 2008). Yet hunger strikes take on a particular valence in prison,
where access to tools of expression are often highly limited, monitoring of daily behavior is constant and the provision of
food is the responsibility of the institution targeted by protest. Scholarly attention to prison hunger strikes has addressed the
tactic’s legality (e.g., Wei and Brendel, 2010), its efficacy as a political act (Passmore, 2009; Dingley and Mollica, 2007)
and its role as a means of demanding dialogue under conditions of extreme and near-totalizing disempowerment (Ziarek,
2008). We focus on these latter two sets of questions, using the construct of askesis to think about how hunger strikes
function as a transfer of political ideology from self to collective, and also between subjects and institutions.
Hunger strikes and askesis
From its earliest historical origins, hunger strikes have functioned through rupturing expected, routinized behavior,
drastically altering even the most basic norms of social interaction and bodily needs. We read hunger strikes as a radical
form of askesis, in which political urgency is mapped quite literally onto the body as an insistence on dialogue when other
means of communication have been foreclosed. Askesis frames hunger strikes as a form of communication that functions
along two axes: from individual to collective action, and from a subject position to an institution. Regarding the former,
askesis offers a model of how protest ideology circulates socially and transitions from an individual to a collective practice.
Hunger strikes require collective action to capture public support outside prison walls, often leading hunger strike leaders to
employ a range of measures, from encouragement to cajoling to threats, in order to ensure continued group participation
(Passmore, 2009; Wallace-Wells, 2014). In terms of a movement from individual subject position to institution, the very
telos of hunger strikes centers on a demand for dialogue, the connection between a subject and the structures of power
surrounding her.
Hunger strikes and incodification
What can we learn from prison hunger strikes in the context of incodification? In thinking about what an online hunger
strike might look like, we argue that such protests would function through the collective display of refusal, and the
production of dialogue that would otherwise be unlikely or impossible. As an example, on 18 January 2012, activists staged
a day-long protest against U.S. legislative bills SOPA and PIPA (Electronic Freedom Foundation, 2012). An estimated 8,000
Web sites, including Wikipedia and Google, participated in an Internet blackout, combined with a coordinated online
education and advocacy campaign. This exercise in political protest contained several elements similar to hunger strikes:
public acts of self-denial combined with exhortations for others to follow suit. We connect these examples of reshaping daily
socio-technical practices to recent work on limiting or terminating participation on social network sites (e.g., Brubaker, et
al., 2014; Portwood-Stacer, 2013). Across these studies, people who leave social media sites note the larger social
consequences of their departure, underscoring our arguments that sociotechnical (dis)engagement takes on a dimension of
askesis when one user leaving a network compels others to reconsider their own relationships to that technology.
In addition to coordinated political acts like blackouts, there are examples of smaller-scale protest through
(non)consumption, such as decisions to unplug or “detox” (Wayne, 2014). These tactics echo the Foucauldian concern of
embodiment and practices of self, where deliberately reshaping daily behaviors produces an ethic of engaging with one’s
surroundings, both socially and technologically. Although less overtly political than page blackouts, detoxing and
unplugging reflect an increasing sense of unease with continuous technological interaction. In the context of continuous
technological surveillance, practices of detoxing, unplugging and blacking out take on an asketic dimension, in that refusal
rebukes established patterns of consumption, such that absence becomes a form of public critique. As noted earlier, we do
not mean to suggest that the physical and psychological toll of hunger strikes can be equated with the reduction of engaging
with online content, and we are wary of doing a disservice to people who leverage hunger strikes as desperate tools of
intervention. Without making claims of equivalence, however, we do see the radical potential of hunger strikes as a means of
increasing agency in the consumption and management of information in everyday life.
Alternative communication networks
While hunger strikes offer an effective method of collectively asserting autonomy and visibility, other technologies of
resistance have emerged to accomplish more immediate, tactical concerns, such as communicating privately under the ever-
watchful eyes of surveillants. In some cases, this challenge arises from the need to organize and coordinate actions internally,
absent officially-sanctioned communication channels. In others, where sanctioned (but censored and surveilled)
communication channels do exist, the challenge is to move contraband information and materials secretly through these
channels, or to build parallel, unsanctioned (but secure) information networks. Finally, in addition to the challenge of
internal communications within prison populations, there is frequently a need to develop private communication conduits
with the “outside world,” either for the purposes of drawing attention to inmates’ individual needs or to coordinate broader
political action. While this set of concerns might seem secondary to the more pressing matters of prisoners’ physical and
psychological safety, it is in fact a necessary prerequisite to both; as Passmore (2009) argued in his discussion of Red Army
Faction prisoners in late Cold War-era Germany, “behind the debate which framed the harsh initial prison conditions in
terms of either ‘security’ or ‘torture’ raged a battle for the control over the flow of information” [12].
In this section, we identify four tactics of resistance employed historically as alternative communication networks within
prison populations: argot, tap codes, encryption and smuggling. We acknowledge that this list is far from comprehensive,
and each warrants at least an article-length discussion on its own, but for present purposes, these examples offer provocative
implications for resistance to mass surveillance among the broader population. The first tactic we discuss is argot, a secret
lexicon employed by prisoners to communicate in the presence of guards and other surveillants without being understood.
Based on his own experience as a political prisoner in 1980s Poland, Kaminski (2004) described how the newly incarcerated
were indoctrinated into the intricacies of the language during “late night courses” taught by a “rotating team of instructors”
[13]. In addition to serving as a platform for secure communications, argot can perform vital secondary functions, as “an
important symbol of group membership among prison inmates” [14], not only differentiating insiders from outsiders, but
establishing tacit hierarchical and structural relationships between communicants. In situations where ethnic or national
divides distinguish prisoners from guards, an exogenous language or dialect can serve as a de facto argot serving all of these
functions. One such historical example is Irish republican prisoners in British-controlled Belfast during the late 1970s
(O’Hearn, 2009).
The second communication tactic is tap code (sometimes called “knock code”), in which prisoners tap on walls or pipes to
communicate words and phrases, typically using a given numbers of taps to transmit a corresponding letter of the alphabet.
These codes most often employ a technique similar to a “Polybius square,” an ancient matrix of letters in which each
character can be signified by two integers. Documented cases of prisoners using tap codes to communicate are numerous,
ranging from nineteenth century Russian political prisoners to American prisoners of war in Vietnam (Blackwood, 2009).
One of the benefits of this code is its relative durability. As McGrath (1975) described of his own time as a prisoner of war,
“the Vietnamese were able to extract, by torture, every detail of the code ... but they never succeeded in stopping us
completely from communicating” [15].
The third platform for resistant communication is textual encryption, a range of methods by which prisoners’ written
communications are secreted via a code substituting one letter for another, or by replacing letters with symbols. As Singh
(2000) chronicled exhaustively, textual encryption has been used in a variety of contexts beyond the prison population, from
military to financial communication networks, for millennia. One example of encryption used in a penal environment is the
pigpen cipher (sometimes called the Freemason cipher), which was used by Union soldiers imprisoned by Confederates
during the American Civil War (Jones, 2013). Another, more complex code employed by British prisoner of war John Pryor
during World War II recently made headlines when it was finally decrypted (after seven decades) by a team of
mathematicians, historians and geographers (Enoch, 2013).
The fourth technology, often employed in conjunction with the third, is smuggling. Although this practice applies to a range
of contraband, from weapons to drugs to cigarettes, it has also been used fruitfully to transmit information. Smuggling
techniques run the gamut from ramshackle to high tech. For intra-prison communications, O’Hearn (2009) described the
technique of “‘shooting buttons’ with strings and messages attached to them across corridors under the cell doors” [16]. For
extramural communications, chroniclers of prison life have described papers hidden in “specially prepared” shoes [17],
carried in the anal cavities of couriers (O’Hearn, 2009), and camouflaged as “defence mail” to be transmitted by prisoners’
lawyers [18]. More recently, mobile phones have been smuggled in increasingly large numbers, hidden in light fixtures, body
cavities, bibles and food jars, thrown over walls, and even flown in via “carrier pigeons, kites and remote-controlled model
helicopters” [19].
Askesis and alternate communication networks
Alternative communication networks, while primarily tactical in nature, also fulfill an asketic role for incarcerated
populations. The act of learning an argot or tap code often represents a rite of passage for an individual inmate, while
teaching and using such codes constitute a process of coordinated resistance. As Kaminski (2003), Einat and Wall (2007)
and others have made clear, adopting a code is as much a proactive bid for group identity as it is a reactive technique of
counter-surveillance. In this way, the process of learning and using the code becomes an act of askesis, in which individual
models of behavior are adopted collectively and deliberately, even in the face of architecture specifically designed to inhibit
coordinated counter-conduct. This dynamic also exists outside of prison walls, in subaltern groups from the “pattin’ juba”
codes of African slaves in the antebellum American south (Sullivan, 2001) to the slang of Los Angeles Pachucos in the
1940s (Ramírez, 2006) and urban Swedish adolescents in the twenty-first century (Milani and Jonsson, 2012). Asketic
themes identified earlier — an insistence on dialogue and collective tactics — are demonstrated quite literally in argot and
tap code, which both facilitate and convene collective practices of dialogue.
Encryption and smuggling can be understood asketically as well. In both cases, something is being hidden in plain sight — a
strategic appropriation and cultural weaponization of the crippling social invisibility often accorded to disenfranchised
populations. While it may seem contradictory to suggest that a subjugated group may be simultaneously invisible and
surveilled, this contradiction is in fact an integral dimension of subjugated subjectivity. In the case of smuggling, the body
itself may serve as the vessel for contraband communications, which adds another dimension of askesis: A body that
functions as a secret-keeper is a body that declares itself to be (at least partially) independent of hegemonic control.
Moreover, such a body becomes emblematic of collective counter-conduct, another connection to Foucault’s
conceptualization of askesis.
Incodification and communication networks
The communication techniques adopted by incarcerated populations offer provocative suggestions for the broader
population to counter incodification. Argot has its analog in digital media dialects, ranging from 1990s “leet” and “geek-
speak” to more contemporary “texting language”, as well as “memetic slang” such as doge speak and LOLcat. In her work
on the hacker group Anonymous, Coleman (2014) referred to dark Internet humor (“lulz”) as argot, arguing that “since argot
is so opaque and particular, it functions to enact secrecy or, at minimum, erect some very stiff social boundaries” [20].
Memetic slang has been used for explicitly resistant purposes in some notable cases, such as the “grass mud horse,” a
Chinese meme made popular in 2009, in which absurd mythical creatures with names that sound phonetically like curse
words are used as a form of critique and resistance to widespread government censorship (Meng, 2011; Wang, 2012). This is
the clearest example of how digital dialects can take on a political dimension, operating as an activist tool of communication.
While there is no direct digital equivalent of the tap code, its two most salient features hold promise for alternative
networked communications. First, tap codes make use of existing infrastructure (e.g., walls, pipes), repurposing those
technologies to transmit messages directly between inmates. Second, tap codes are surveillable, in that prison guards can
intercept and even decode messages, but not censorable, in that it would be impossible to stop transmissions without
sequestering every inmate or destroying crucial infrastructure. In both respects, the digital communications platform that
bears the greatest similarity to the tap code is the wireless mesh network (Reynolds, et al., 2011; Sinnreich, et al., 2011). In a
typical mesh scenario, such as Commotion or FireChat, wireless network devices like mobile phones and routers are
repurposed to connect directly to one another without an intermediary. When hundreds or thousands of such devices are
connected via these individual peer-to-peer connections, a larger network emerges, capable of transmitting messages across
large distances and among many users without ever passing through the Internet backbone or a mobile data tower. As with
tap codes, it is easy for surveillants to intercept messages on a mesh network, and given the decryption key, to decode those
messages. Yet mesh networks also share the code’s durability; short of putting a given communicant in solitary confinement
without access to a mobile device or jamming wireless signals on a given frequency across a broad area, there is little a
surveillant can do to prevent people en masse from establishing or using a mesh network.
Of all the tactics discussed in this section, encrypted prison communications have perhaps the most obvious online
counterpart, namely encrypted digital communications. Encryption on the Internet is so prevalent that it often goes
unnoticed or unappreciated by the end user, as when a consumer uses transport layer security (TLS) or a secure socket layer
(SSL) while shopping on a retail Web site like Amazon.com. These technologies gained a greater level of visibility after
whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that government agencies paid computer security companies to engineer “back
door” flaws in their algorithms, allowing organizations like the NSA to surveil encrypted communications (Menn, 2013),
followed by well-publicized information security breaches like the “heartbleed” bug in TLS (Felten and Kroll, 2014) and the
FBI hacking of a suspected terrorist’s iPhone (Abdollah, 2016). Since then, there has been growing public commentary on
and adoption of voluntary peer-to-peer encryption protocols, such as the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), and encryption-based
communications platforms like Tor, WhatsApp and Telegram.
The final tactic, smuggling, has many applications in the context of networked digital communications. One is the use of
virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxy servers, an increasingly popular practice in which Internet traffic is routed
through a remote server on its way from a site or service to an end user, effectively concealing the user’s identity and
obscuring her Internet habits. Another technique is steganography, a tactic of hiding a piece of encrypted digital information
inside another digital file — for instance, hiding a spreadsheet inside of a picture of a cat posted to a Web page. In these and
other cases, information can be said to be “smuggled” in that either digital files themselves or traffic on digital
communication networks is transformed to look like something innocuous. Beyond thinking of smuggling in strictly
technical terms, we can also point to more socio-cultural approaches. For example, in Boyd and Marwick’s (2011) analysis
of teens’ privacy practices, the authors use the term “steganography” to refer to the use of slang and cultural references (like
song titles or movie quotes) as a means of directing certain portions of their online content to a target subsection of their peer
group. boyd and Marwick interpreted these practices as a means of coping with context collapse, yet steganography can also
be read as a method of managing continuous surveillance, targeting messages exclusively to intended recipients regardless of
the assumed presence of others.
All of these techniques are already in use among dissidents, cyberlibertarians and other proponents of free speech on digital
networks [21], and general awareness of these tactics has grown visibly in recent years. Yet not all use is strictly
instrumental; just as with alternative communication networks in prison settings, there is an asketic dimension to the use of
these forms of counter-conduct. By using GPG to sign and/or encrypt e-mail messages or by accessing the Web via Tor,
even a communicant with “nothing to hide” is performing privacy as a positive social value, and signaling affiliation with
others who share this value; in the case of many privacy protocols, such performances also serve the instrumental purpose of
strengthening network security through increased numbers. This performativity extends beyond the adoption of technology
to the more symbolic decoration of networked devices. For instance, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an advocacy
group that promotes civil liberties in cyberspace, sells stickers as a fundraising tool bearing the legend “I do not consent to
the search of this device” (see Figure 2). Clearly, few who adorn their devices with such slogans can actually expect law
enforcement or other surveillants to respect the message; the statement is rhetorical in nature and primarily serves the
purpose of signaling group affiliation and promoting awareness of civil liberties. Quotidian practices of interacting with
technology can thus take on a rhetorical dimension that instructs others with similar values on behaviors that reflect those
values.
Disruptive displays of art
As our final example, we consider the phenomenon of viral dance videos choreographed in prison, which we connect both to
askesis and Rancière’s (2013) work on aesthetic politics. By viral dance videos, we refer to a contemporary media
phenomenon of online videos depicting highly choreographed dances performed by prisoners, the most famous example of
which comes from the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC) in the Philippines, where inmate
performances have included Michael Jackson’s “Thriller”, a Queen medley and Psy’s “Gangnam Style.” The CPDRC’s
choreographed dances began in 2007 as a dance therapy rehabilitation program [22], the brainchild of then-warden Byron
Garcia. These videos have been theorized in terms of their implications for social justice in penal contexts (Mangaoang,
2013) and in light of cultural globalization and hegemony (Perillo, 2011). We read these media artifacts for the political
work they are capable of instigating through convening an online audience. Viral dance videos contain multiple layers of
absurdity: the stark contrast of foreign pop songs in a Filipino prison; the paradox of a spectacle that offers a rare glimpse
inside a prison yet nonetheless reveals little because it is so clearly staged; the contradiction between dance as pleasure and
play versus circumstances of institutional coercion. As such, we view prison dance videos as profoundly contradictory, at
once highly mediated (produced explicitly for purposes of redistribution) and ultimately illegible. It is precisely this
inscrutability that we see as potentially disruptive in the context of incodification.
Physical choreography that is dismissed as purposeless or absurd has an extensive history among the incarcerated. Examples
include the Marquis de Sade’s famous theater performances with fellow mental institute inmates (Brookes, 1975), as well as
the more recent film Caesar must die (Taviani and Taviani, 2013), a performance of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar staged by
maximum-security inmates in Italy. As another example, capoeira emerged among Caribbean slaves who were training for
physical combat while seeming to participate in harmless forms of dance (Downey, 2005). While viral dance videos
constitute only the most recent genre of incarcerated choreography, focusing specifically on this phenomenon allows closer
consideration of two key components that have surfaced throughout our analysis of incarcerated counter-conduct: agency
and legibility.
Agency, consent, legibility and counter-conduct
Early reports on the CPRDC’s “dance therapy” indicated that inmates were forced to participate in the choreographies, and
that refusal could result in beatings or the removal of certain privileges (Galang, 2010; McCarthy, 2013); in one case, an
inmate’s release was delayed because he was needed in a performance (Mangaoang, 2013). Since Garcia’s departure as
warden in 2010, participation is allegedly voluntary, although as Mangaoang noted, the notion of choice is somewhat
suspect in coercive environments [23]. Whatever the degree of agency that inmates have in participating in these
choreographies, there is certainly a gap in agency between inmates and those who watch and circulate videos. Perillo (2011)
argued that the hegemonic rhetoric of dance as a form of rehabilitation masks the true discursive work done by the videos
[24]. For Perillo, watching viral dance videos only becomes political with an adequately nuanced understanding of
incarcerated subjectivity, which requires a reading of otherness that isn’t purely about establishing binaries of inside or
outside, free or institutionalized. While we agree, we draw on Rancière’s notion of political aesthetics to unpack how
resistance to this kind of simplification and essentialism can take shape.
The widespread fascination with viral dance videos (indicated by the substantial number of YouTube views and comments,
as well as mainstream media attention) points to the contradiction of simultaneous attention and inscrutability. For Rancière
(2013), illegibility is a deeply powerful form of political protest. In the context of political discourse, Rancière defined
aesthetics as:
A delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and
noise, that simultaneously determines the place and stakes of politics as a form of
experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it,
around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of
spaces and the possibilities of time. [25]
Aesthetically, viral dance videos echo Rancière’s description, in that they delineate the visible and invisible, the legible and
the obscured. When deprived of a voice, coordinated action demonstrates solidarity, without an obvious political valence,
and it is precisely this lack, the inability or unwillingness to speak in prescribed genres or registers, that constitutes counter-
conduct.
In gauging the political efficacy of these videos, we can ask what value they might have in opening up a space for critical
engagement with media production and the politics of viewership. In his work on information diets, Lovink (2013) argues
that:
There is a need to design daily rituals of sovereignty from the network. If we do this,
we may no longer get lost in browsing, surfing, and searching, but when the techno-
social routines become meaningless and there is nothing left to report, there is a
similar danger of “rienisme.” That’s the moment when we need to come up with
passionate forms of disengagement from the virtual world. [26]
Drawing together this need for “rituals of sovereignty” and “passionate forms of disengagement,” we see a productive
convergence of aesthetics and askesis. In his analysis of absurdist comedy, Holm (2011) leveraged Rancière’s concept of
aesthetics to theorize “how humour might operate as a gap in the sensible itself, and thereby explore the political potential of
a contemporary aesthetics of humour” [27]. Holm went on to argue that absurdist humor disrupts the ordinary and the
hegemonic, suddenly revealing embedded ideologies and hierarchies undergirding everyday infrastructures and values. One
mode of counter-conduct offered by the example of viral dance videos is the production of content that is inscrutable in
form, and potentially asketic in that these videos invite their viewers to participate in and initiate other forms of collective,
absurdist play. These new arrangements of the nonsensical can become powerful tools of forming community and critiquing
conditions of incodification.
Viral dance videos and incodification
Viral dance videos require an audience to succeed as a form of political intervention, connecting this form of counter-
conduct to a larger history of absurdist and artistic practices, including Dada and Situationism. In terms of absurdist art
practices informed or enabled by online technologies, we see resonances between viral dance videos and practices like flash
mobs (Bimber, et al., 2005), which are directed not only to a live audience but also to remote viewers, as well as artifacts like
memes (Shifman, 2014), which can be characterized as media content that circulates and changes with the potential for rapid
dissemination of political messages (see Rentschler and Thrift (2015) on the “binder full of women” meme as a feminist
tactic of political commentary). Flash mobs in particular tend to leverage aesthetic inscrutability as integral to their efficacy
as a form of provocation. The shared affordance of resistance embedded in viral dance videos, memes and flash mobs lies in
using absurdity to produce a response of confusion or surprise, which can in turn provoke a consideration of the conditions
that enable (or demand) artifacts of such inscrutability. It is in these interpretive moments that political discourse becomes
necessary.
We also see resonances with neo-Situationist performance groups like Improv Everywhere and Surprise Surveillance
Theater, and art performances directed to CCTV, such as Banksy’s guerilla street-based artwork (Moore, 2008). The actors
involved in these coordinations have notably more agency than CPRDC inmates in terms of whether and how to participate.
Yet, the ability to consent to surveillance and monitoring is also quite limited for these unincarcerated performers; even the
most strident privacy advocates concede that the efforts required to ensure greater protection from monitoring are beyond
the abilities of most Internet users (and urban pedestrians). So although the conditions under which these different efforts are
produced are radically different, there is nonetheless a resonance of spectacle and absurdity in the midst of highly
regimented surveillance. Displays of illegibility offer, however briefly, a rupture in the typically invisible networks of
incodified living, the quotidian infrastructures of surveillance and monitoring. These ruptures in turn present moments of
reflection, coordination and counter-conduct.
1. This ubiquity is neatly captured by a quote from Ira Hunt, the Chief Technology Officer of the Central Intelligence
Agency: “Since you can’t connect dots you don’t have, it drives us into a mode of, we fundamentally try to collect
everything and hang on to it forever” (quoted in Webster, 2013).
2. Murphy, 2012, p. 183.
3. Appadurai, 2001, p. 37.
4. Foucault, 1985, p. 72.
5. Bernauer and Rasmussen, 1988, p. 2.
6. Foucault, 1985, p. 73.
7. Doran, 2011, pp. 16–17.
8. We use the term tactic in the specifically Certeauian (1984) sense, referring to everyday practices of individual navigation
and play in larger institutionalized strategies. Because tactics can expose ideological artifacts of larger institutional
infrastructures, such tactics can take on a political valence even when not explicitly intended as such by their originators.
9. Dingley and Mollica, 2007, p. 461.
10. Ziarek, 2008, p. 99.
Conclusion
Even before the 2013 disclosures of mass surveillance by the U.S. government, Internet studies scholars noted a growing
unease and fatigue with social network services stemming from users’ broad privacy concerns (Andrejevic, 2013) as well as
a lack of fit between technological and political ideologies (Portwood-Stacer, 2013). For many end users, the chief concern
driving engagement with interactive services has shifted from “how can I manage all the information I encounter?” to “how
is information about me being managed?” In this context, our objective has been to theorize how structures of information
surveillance can themselves be managed and subverted via tactics of online counter-conduct. We conclude by considering
implications of our analysis for academic as well as activist work on structures of surveillance in everyday life.
For academics, we hope that the concept of incodification can be deployed as an analytical lens for discussing specific
relations and structures of informatic power. “Surveillance” is a term that, in its generality, fails to account for the scale,
complexity and granularity of the monitoring that occurs via online networks. While surveillance tends to be conceptualized
in terms of two actors (x surveills y — see Bossewitch and Sinnreich, 2013), incodification addresses the conditions and
consequences of surveillance as facets of technological infrastructures. A feature of infrastructure is its ability to conceal the
circumstances of its origins, to render itself invisible (and beyond contestation) through normalization of its use (Bowker and
Star, 1999). A key aim of introducing incodification as a conceptual apparatus is to encourage a critical stance towards
infrastructures of surveillance, and as a reminder that because these infrastructural interventions are deliberate, serving some
interests more than others, they can be unmade just as deliberately.
For activists, we hope that articulating connections between incarceration and incodification will help to build dialogue
between people working in the largely separate fields of digital rights and prison reform. We hope that incodification will
yield a new lexicon for thinking tactically about developing critical and resistant relationships to technologies, creating a
framework in which digital detoxes, flash mobs and viral videos take on a political valence. Incodification draws together
actions and networks under a larger coalition of resistance, a more unified but also more heterogeneous movement agitating
for structural change. From a policy standpoint, we need a political vocabulary that can account for a wide range of
sociotechnical issues (such as intellectual property, net neutrality and privacy) as deeply connected, and moreover as
stemming from the same infrastructural systems of monitoring and control. By naming and problematizing incodification
itself, we hope that policy-makers will be able to anticipate the emergent consequences of their decisions, weighing short-
term tactical, political and economic concerns against the long-term implications for liberty, agency and quality of life
among populations whose lives and livelihoods are increasingly enmeshed with networks of pervasive data collection and
analysis. 
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Notes
11. Wei and Brendel, 2010, p. 76.
12. Passmore, 2009, p. 38.
13. Kaminski, 2004, p. 208.
14. Einat and Wall, 2007, p. 176.
15. McGrath, 1975, p. 34.
16. O’Hearn, 2009, p. 512, n. 14; our own personal communications with former federal inmates confirms that this tactic is
used in U.S. prisons as well.
17. Kaminski, 2003, p. 214.
18. Passmore, 2009, p. 39.
19. Christie, 2010, p. 31.
20. Coleman, 2014, p. 31.
21. We would be remiss in omitting that these practices are also used in criminal activities.
22. Mangaoang, 2013, p. 51.
23. Mangaoang, 2013, p. 51.
24. Perillo, 2011, p. 621.
25. Rancière, 2013, p. 13.
26. Holm, 2011, paragraph 7.
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